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After the Gulf War: Prosecuting Iraqi
Crimes Under the Rule of Law
Louis Renb Beres*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, Professor Beres proposes that Iraqi crimes committed during the Gulf War should be prosecuted under internationallaw. He suggests that the United States should take the lead in this prosecution,
utilizing a Nuremberg-style trial.
The Article first discusses history of the antigenocide regime in the international arena. The criminalizationof genocide has been built upon
the norms of internationalcustom, natural law principles, and generally-accepted principles of law recognized by civilized nations.Moreover,
evidence of this regime may be found in the Genocide Convention, the
United Nations Charter, and other treaties and conventions.
Professor Beres next examines the problems attendant to enforcement
of an antigenocide regime. States must reject claims to domestic jurisdiction and allow humanitarianintervention when the claim involves gross
outrages against human rights.
The Article concludes that the antigenocide regime must be enforced
against Iraq now. There is an obligation, particularly by the United
States, to bring major Iraqi war criminals to trial. The author suggests
that a specially-created ad hoc tribunal, such as the one created at Nuremberg, could be convened in Iraq or, more likely, in Kuwait. Professor
Beres contends that the United States should lead this prosecution effort
because of its special role in military operations supporting the Security
Council resolutions, its historic role at Nuremberg, and its authority in
prosecuting such crimes in its own federal courts.
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In the months immediately following the end of the recent Gulf War,
evidence mounted for major Iraqi crimes under international
law'-including crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. 2 Significantly, however no authoritative steps have been taken

1. Although criminal acts of terrorism sponsored by Iraq during the brief Gulf War
were not technically "Nuremberg-category crimes," they could qualify as an additional
offense for allied prosecution. For current conventions in force concerning terrorism, see
generally, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, done Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force for the United States, Feb. 20, 1977); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force for the United States, Dec. 13, 1972); Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention),
done Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force for the
United States, Dec. 4, 1969); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 (entered into force for the
United States, Oct. 14, 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (entered into force for the United States, Jan. 26, 1973); International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages, done Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 1, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (entered
into force on June 3, 1983; entered into force for the United States, Jan. 6, 1985); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90
(entered into force, Aug. 4, 1978). On December 9, 1985, the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution
on this question. The United Nations left unaddressed, however, the issue of which particular acts constitute terrorism, other than acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking, and
attacks on internationally protected persons, which have been criminalized by previous
custom and conventions. See G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at
301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
2. Saddam Hussein's enormous crimes against the environment in Kuwait quite
plausibly will lead to a broadening of the concept of "crimes against humanity" or to the
creation of the altogether new crime of "ecocide." A defense, paralleling the defense at
Nuremberg, may raise the issue of retroactivitty. If this happens, prosecutors should consider that there are always special occasions and circumstances for which the codified law
fails to make an explicit and precise provision. In any event, natural law would be binding here. Moreover, ex post facto laws are not always unjust. Such a reminder would
recognize that the defendaant sh-0iildo[ject
-to ex postfacto laws when, after the defendant
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yet to prosecute these crimes along the lines established by the special
military tribunal at Nuremberg3 Recognizing that the time to act is
now, and that further delay would seriously imperil the foundations of
international criminal law, victorious coalition states should move expeditiously to establish a Nuremberg-style trial." Naturally, these
prosecutorial arrangements should be made under the general aegis and
commits an action indifferent in itself, a legislator for the first time declares it to have
been a crime. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46. Under such circumstances, it is impossible for the perpetrator of the action to foresee that the action, innocent when done, should afterwards be converted to a crime. In the case of Iraqi crimes
against the environment, however, especially the torching of Kuwaiti oil wells, Hussein's
actions were hardly indifferent; he assuredly had mens rea, or criminal intent. Furthermore, all civilized states considered these acts criminal at the time of their commission.
Iraq's commission of new forms of environmental destruction and environmental manipulation as a form of warfare are clearly international crimes under existing conventions. The international dumping of millions of barrels of Kuwaiti and Saudi oil into the
Persian Gulf and the torching of Kuwaiti oil wells represent clear and egregious violations of international agreements. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, art. 53, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3552, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 322; see also Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, done Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T.
333, 16 I.L.M. 88. Regarding Saddam Hussein's "eco-terrorism" against Kuwaiti oil
wells, a number of pertinent instruments pertain to marine pollution. See International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, opened for signature May
12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, opened for signature June 4, 1974, 13
I.L.M. 352; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 19, 1969, 9
I.L.M. 45.
3. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, done
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
4.

See

REPORT OF ROBERT

H.

JACKSON TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

223 (Department of State ed., 1949). The judgment of the International Military Tribunal of October 1, 1946 rested on the four Allied Powers' London
Agreement of August 8, 1945, to which they annexed a Charter establishing the Tribunal. Nineteen other states subsequently acceded to the London Agreement. In addition to
the 42 volumes of official documents on the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War
Criminals before the InternationalMilitary Tribunal published by that Tribunal, the
United Nations War Crimes Commission selected and edited 89 additional cases, published in 15 volumes. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (H.M. Stationery Office ed. 1947). See also 15 id. at 15588 (analysis of defense pleas of "superior orders" in various war crimes trials). For German war crimes trials after the First World War, including the case of Dithmar and
Boldt, see Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, 16 AM. J.
INT'L L. 674, 708 (1922).
MILITARY TRIALS,
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authority of the United Nations.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE ANTIGENOCIDE REGIME

Although genocide has always been prohibited by international law,5
the post-World War II criminalization of genocide has been especially
explicit and far-reaching. Building upon the norms established by international custom, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, the writings of highly qualified publicists, various treaties and conventions, and the overriding principles of natural law, this
criminalization has taken place under the auspices of the Allies and the
United Nations and has flowed largely from initial reactions to the
Holocaust.
A,

The Genocide Convention

The core element of the antigenocide regime is the Genocide-Coxnvoention.0 While this convention excludes liability when potential offenders
annihilate victims solely on political grounds, the exclusion has little or
nothing to do with the problem of limiting mass murder under interna7
tional law.
B.

Genocide as Contrary to a Jus Cogens

Today, there exists a well-established normative order for the protection of all human rights. Peremptory norms, or jus cogens rules, that
5. This prohibition results because the norms of international law can be found in
sources other than treaties and conventions.
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted
Dec. 9, 1948. S. EXEC. Doc. 0, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
7. According to the language of the Genocide Convention, it is unlikely that such
mass murders as took place in Indonesia in 1965, in which the victims were identified as
communists, or in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, in which the victims were classes
deemed suspect by the Khmer Rouge, can be called genocide. Helen Fein calls these
"ideological slaughters." See Helen Fein, Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide
and Critical Responses, in TOWARD THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE ON THE

HOLOCAUST

AND GENOCIDE (Israel W. Charny, ed., 1984). Leo Kuper calls them "genocidal massacres." See LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 10 (1981). Other similar acts of genocide include Stalin's liquidation of the Kulaks
and Idi Amin's murders in Uganda. In Uganda, although ethnicity sometimes played a
role in the killings, as in.the massacre of Acholi and Lango soldiers in the Ugandan
army, instances of political massacres also occurred. For example, the annihilation of the
supporters of the ousted president and of his opponents in general were political killings.

1991]

IRAQI GULF WAR CRIMES

endow all human beings with a basic measure of dignity and that permit
no derogation by states, comprise this order. These internationally protected human rights can be grouped into three broad categories. The first
is the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the
person, violations that include torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of a
fair public trial; and invasion of the home. The second category is the
right to the fulfillment of vital needs such as food, shelter, health care,
and education. The third category includes the right to enjoy civil and
political liberties, including freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly; the right to participate in government; the right to travel freely
within and outside one's own state; and the right to be free from discrimination based on race or sex.
C. The United Nations Charter
Taken with other important covenants, treaties, and declarations,
which together make up the human rights regime, the Genocide Convention represents the end of the idea of absolute sovereignty concerning
nonintervention when human rights are in grievous jeopardy. The Charter of the United Nations (the Charter) stipulates in its Preamble and
several articles that international law protects human rights.8 In the Preamble, the peoples of the United Nations reaffirm their faith "in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small," and
in their determination "to promote social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom."
Article 1 lists a main purpose of the United Nations as "promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."' 0 Similarly, in article 55, the Charter seeks "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."'" And in article 56, all
members of the United Nations "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in [a]rticle 55. '' 12
In promoting human rights, various special responsibilities devolve
8. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, 62.
9. Id. at pmbl.
10. Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
11. Id. at art. 55.
12. Id. at art. 56.
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upon specific organs of the United Nations. Under article 13 of the
Charter, one function of the General Assembly is to assist "in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."' 3 In addition to referring
human rights matters to certain permanent committees, the General Assembly periodically has established ad hoc subsidiary organs."4
Under article 62 of the Charter, the Economic and Social Council has
certain responsibilities for promoting human rights. Article 64 confers
additional responsibilities. The Commission on Human Rights, established in 1946, is one of the fundamental commissions of the Economic
and Social Council. Since its inception, the Commission has worked towards submitting proposals, recommendations, and reports to the Council on matters regarding virtually all aspects of human rights. Finally, all
of the other primary organs of the United Nations may be concerned
occasionally with the protection of human rights.
In light of these codified expressions of the international law of human
rights, individual states no longer can claim sovereign immunity from
responsibility for gross mistreatment of their own citizens. Notwithstanding article 2(7) of the Charter, which reaffirms certain areas of domestic
jurisdiction, international law now clearly obligates each state to uphold
basic human rights. 15 Even the failure to ratify specific treaties or con-

13. Id. at art. 13, para. l(b).
14. Primary responsibility for the promotion of human rights under the United Nations Charter rests in the General Assembly and, under its authority, in the Economic
and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission's activity,
for the most part, is undertaken by subsidiary working groups, one of which is created
each year to consider and make recommendations concerning alleged "gross violations" of
human rights. From time to time, the Commission on Human Rights also appoints special envoys to examine human rights situations on an ad hoc basis and to prepare reports
on these situations. Since 1980, the Commission has publicly disclosed reports of particular investigations initiated by complaints against Equatorial Guinea, Bolivia, Democratic
Kampuchea, El Salvador, Guatemala, pre-Sandinista Nicaragua, the Soviet Union (relating to Afghanistan), Poland, and Iran. Special examples of subsidiary organs of an ad
hoc character created by the General Assembly include the Special Committee on the
Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Special
Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
15. This point was at the very heart of the Nuremberg process, and a defense for its
pertinent prosecutorial implications under international criminal law was made by the
British Chief Prosecutor:
Normally international law concedes that it is for the State to decide how it shall
treat its own nationals; it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction .... Yet international
law has in the past made some claim that there is a limit to the omnipotence of the
State and that the individual human being, the ultimate unit of all law, is not
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ventions' 8 does not confer immunity from responsibility, since all states
are bound by the law of the Charter and by the customs and general
principles of law from which these agreements derive."7
D. Natural Law
The international regime on human rights also establishes, beyond
any reasonable doubt, the continuing validity of natural law as the overriding basis of international law. This establishment flows directly from
the judgments at Nuremberg. While the allies cast the indictments of the
Nuremberg Tribunal in terms of existing positive law,18 the actual decisions of the tribunal unambiguously rejected the proposition that the validity of international law depends upon its positiveness. The words used
by the Tribunal 9 derive from the principle; nullum crimen sine poena,
or no crime without a punishment. This principle, however, contradicts
the central idea that underlies positive jurisprudence, or law as command
of a sovereign.
II.

GENOCIDE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

While there exists a regime of binding international agreements that
places worldwide human welfare above the particular interests of individual states or elites, what can this regime be expected to accomplish?
Admittedly, explicit and codified rules of international law that pertain
to genocide and genocide-like crimes exist, but what can be done about

disentitled to the protection of mankind when the State tramples upon its rights in
a manner that outrages the conscience of mankind .... The fact is that the right of
humanitarian intervention by war is not a novelty in international law-can inter-

vention by judicial process then be illegal?
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF

THE NfiRNBERG TRIBUNAL

71, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/5, U.N. Sales No. 149.V.7 (1949).

16. The United States, for example, had not ratified the Genocide Convention until
recently.
17. The rationale for this claim is grounded in the understanding, codified at article

38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, that there are multiple sources of
international law and in the associated principle, codified at article 53 of the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaties, or that jus cogens are overriding norms and permit
no derogation. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, done June 26, 1945, art.

38 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
18.

Positive law is defined as law enacted by states.

19.

"So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrongs were

allowed to go unpunished." A. P.
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

110 (1964).

D'ENTREVES, NATURAL

LAW: AN

INTRODUCTION TO

494
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their effective enforcement? A consideration of post-World War II history reveals many instances of genocide and genocide-like crimes. Where
was international law?
To answer these questions, one must first recall that international law
is a distinctive and unique system of law. It is decentralized rather than
centralized, and it exists within a social setting-the world political system-that lacks a comprehensive government. In the absence of central
authoritative institutions for the making, interpretation, and enforcement
of law, these juridical processes devolve upon individual states. Individual states have the responsibility, acting alone or in collaboration with
each other, to enforce international law with respect to genocide and genocide-like crimes.2
How can this be done? In terms of the law of the Charter, it is essential that states continue to reject the article 2(7) claim to domestic jurisdiction whenever the claim involves gross outrages against human rights.
Although judgments of national self-interest typically determine the tension between the doctrines of domestic jurisdiction and international concern, it would be in the long-term interest of all states to oppose forcefully all crimes against humanity. As Vattel correctly observed:
But we know too well from sad experience how little regard those who are
at the head of affairs pay to rights when they conflict with some plan by
which they hope to profit. They adopt a line of policy which is often false,
because often unjust; and the majority of them think that they have done
enough in having mastered that. Nevertheless it can be said of States,
what has long been recognized as true of individuals, that the wisest and
the safest policy is one that is founded upon justice. 2
With this observation, Vattel echoes Cicero's contention that "[n]o one

20. An important aspect of this responsibility revolves around the obligation to extradite hostes humani generis or an enemy of all mankind. This characterization is a basis
in international law for universal jurisdiction. The obligation to extradite under this concept has been recognized by Vattel:
If the sovereign of the country in which the crimes of this nature [crimes involving
"scommon enemies of mankind"], have been committed requests the surrender of
the perpetrators for the purpose of punishing them, they should be turned over to
him as being the one who has first interest in inflicting exemplary punishment
upon them; and as it is proper that the guilty should be convicted after a trial
conducted with due process of law, we have another reason why criminals of this
class are ordinarily delivered up to the States in which the crimes have been
committed.
3 EMMERRICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW 93 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (1758).
21. Id. at 12a.
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who has not the strictest regard for justice can administer public affairs
to advantage."'22 The issue arises, however, of how to move from assessment to action, from prescription to policy. Where, exactly, is the normative juncture between the theory of human rights as pragmatic practice
and the operationalization of that theory?
The terms of article 56 of the United Nations Charter urge member
states to "take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization" to promote human rights. Reinforced by an abundant body of
ancillary prescriptions, this obligation stipulates that the legal community of humankind must allow, indeed require, humanitarian intervention by individual states in certain circumstances. Intervention, however,
must not be used as a pretext for aggression, and it must conform to
settled legal norms governing the use of force, especially the principles of
discrimination, military necessity, and proportionality. Understood in
terms of the long-standing distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, this means that even where the justness of humanitarian intervention clearly exists, the means used in that intervention must be limited.
The lawfulness of a cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain
forms of violence.
The legality of humanitarian intervention has been established for a
long time.2" Although it has been reinforced strongly by the post-Nuremberg human rights regime, one may find support for the doctrine in Grotius' seventeenth-century classic, The Law of War and Peace. Here, the
author advanced and defended the idea that states may interfere within
the valid territorial sphere of other states to protect innocent persons
from their own rulers. The natural law origins of international law nurtured and sustained this idea:
This too is a matter of controversy, whether there may be a just cause for
undertaking war on behalf of the subjects of another ruler, in order to
protect them from wrong at his hands. Now it is certain that, from the
time when political associations were formed, each of their rulers has
sought to assert some particular right over his own subjects.2
22. Id. (quoting MARCUS

TALLIUS CICERO, DE LEGIBAS,

Book 1).

23. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention on behalf of beleaguered citizens of other states has ample precedent, prefiguring even the post-Nuremberg legal order. One of the earliest recorded cases of such intervention concerns an event that took
place in 480 B.C., when Prince Gelon of Syracuse, after defeating the Carthaginians,
demanded as one of the conditions of peace that they abandon the custom of sacrificing
their children to Saturn. In the nineteenth century, the high point of positivist jurisprudence, the humanitarian intervention of Great Britain, France, and Russia in 1827 attempted to end Turkey's inhumane methods against the Greek struggle for independence.
24. The quotation continued:
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Vattel's argument in The Law of Nations supports the idea that nations have obligations to contribute to the welfare and happiness in other
states. For example, Vattel argues that in the event of civil war, states
"must aid that one of the two parties 'which seems to have justice on its
'25
side' or protect an unfortunate people from an unjust'tyrant.
While the theory of international law still oscillates between an individualist conception of the state and a universalist conception of humanity, the post-World War II regime of treaties, conventions, and declarations concerning human rights necessarily bases itself upon a broad
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, this regime's purpose is to
legitimize an allocation of competencies that favors the natural rights of
humankind over any particular interests of the state. Since violations of
essential human rights are now undeniably within the ambit of global
responsibility, the subjectivism of state primacy has been subordinated
unambiguously to the enduring primacy of international justice.26 In

As we see in the Children of Hercules, by Euripides makes: "Just are we who
within our city dwell, And judgment we may render with full power." Here too
applies the following: "Sparata, which is thy lot, adorn; we for Mycenae shall
have care." Among the signs of supreme power Thucydides reckoned "having their
own courts of justice" no less than "the right to make their own laws and levy
taxes. . . ." The purpose no doubt is, as Ambrose correctly explains, "to prevent
men from provoking wars by usurping the care for things under the control of
others."
In Thucydides the Corinthians find it just that "each party should punish its
own subjects." Perseus, in his speech to Marcius refused to present a defence [sic]
of his conduct toward the Dolopes, saying: "I have acted by viture of my right,
since they belonged to my kingdom and were subject to my authority." But all
these rights have force in cases, where subjects are actually in the wrong, and also,
you may add, where the cause is doubtful.
If, however, the wrong is obvious, in case some Busiris, Phalaris, or Thracian
Diomede should inflict upon his subjects such treatment as no one is warranted in
inflicting, the exercise of the right in human society is not precluded.
2 HuGo GRoTius, DE JURE BELLI AC PAcis LIBRI TREs 583-84 (james Brown Scott
ed. & Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford University Press 1925) (1625).
25. VATTEL, supra note 19, at xii.
26. As an answer to the question, quid ius?-what is law?-international law now
rejects all empirical solutions that substitute force for justice. Rather than accept the neoKantian distinction between the "concept" and the "ideal" of law, international law now
recognizes that the concept and the ideal coincide. Evidence of this recognition can be
found in the documentary forms of the current human rights regime and in the generally
diminished willingness by states to exempt internationally important activity from international legal regulation by deference to the dogma of domestic jurisdiction. For example, the United Nations has rejected persistently South Africa's invocation of article 2(7)
to shield its practice of apartheid. Significantly, apartheid is linked with genocide in the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crimes of
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place of the Hegelian concept of the state as an autonomous, irreducible
center of authority-because it is an ideal that is the perfect manifestation of Mind-there is now in force a greatly expanded version of the
idea of international concern.
III.

ENFORCING THE ANTiIGENOCIDE REGIME AGAINST IRAQ

A.

The Obligation to Prosecute Iraqi War Criminals

Now that the Gulf War has ended, prosecution of Saddam Hussein
and the surviving members of his Revolutionary Council must occur, or
justice will be defiled and international law will be undermined tragically. Between August 2, 1990, the date of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
and October 29, 1990, the Security Council adopted ten resolutions explicitly condemning Hussein's regime for multiple crimes of the gravest
possible nature. These crimen contra omnes;27 crimes so terrible that
they mandate universal enforcement, jurisdiction, and responsibility;
would cry out for legal prosecution even if there had been no authorizing
resolutions by the United Nations Security Council. This is because the
now-documented barbarous activities of Iraq against Kuwait and other
nationals in Kuwait, against coalition prisoners of war in Iraq and Kuwait, and against noncombatant populations in Israel and Saudi Arabia
violated peremptory norms .of international law, which are absolutely
binding and allow no deviation whatsoever.2
Significantly, the Security Council issued its resolutions before the coApartheid, and several efforts have been undertaken to make the practice of apartheid an
offense under the terms of the Genocide Convention. Moreover, the Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity qualifies "inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid" as "crimes against
humanity." Also, various United Nations documents associate apartheid with both genocide and crimes against humanity. See, e.g., Measures to Be Taken Against Nazism and
Racial Intolerance, G.A. Res. 2545, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. A7820 (1970);
G.A. Res. 2438, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7435 (1969). On the particular
crime of apartheid, see International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, done Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. See also International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
27. Crimen contra omnes literally means "crimes against all."
28. Even a treaty that seeks to criminalize forms of insurgency protected by a peremptory norm would be invalid. According to article 53 of the Vienna Convention, "[a]
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law." Vienna Convention, supra note 16, at art. 53. The concept is
extended to newly emerging peremptory norms by article 64 of the Vienna Convention:
"[i]f a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty
which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id. at art. 64.
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alition forces uncovered the most serious Iraqi crimes.2 9 This implies
that our current system of international law establishes, beyond any reasonable doubt, the primacy of justice and human rights in world affairs.
The ancient principle of nullum crimen sine poena, or no crime without
penalty, applies with particular clarity and urgency to the crimes of Saddam Hussein and his followers.
From the United States point of view, the Nuremberg obligations to
bring major Iraqi criminals to trial in a sense doubly binds it. These
obligations not only represent current obligations under international
law, but also the higher law obligations found in the political tradition of
the United States. Therefore, the United States may be compelled to
act.2 0 By the codification of the principle that basic human rights in war
and in peace are now peremptory, the Nuremberg obligations reflect
perfect convergence between international law and the enduring foundation of the United States.
B.

Location of the Trials

The question of where to hold the trials remains."1 Nuremberg had
been expected widely to be a precursor for the establishment of a perma29. Two later resolutions concerning enforcement were adopted on November 28 and
November 29, 1990.
30. The principle of a higher law is one of the enduring and canonic principles in
the history of the United States. Codified in both the Declaration of Independence and in
the United States Constitution, it rests upon the acceptance of certain notions of right
and justice that obtain because of their intrinsic merit. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE
HIGHER LAW BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84-85 (1928).
These notions, as Blackstone declared, are nothing less than "the eternal, immutable
laws of good and evil, to which the Creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and
which he has enabled human reason to discover so far as they are necessary for the
conduct of human actions." When Jefferson set to work to draft the Declaration of Independence, he drew freely upon Aristotle, Cicero, Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui,
and Locke's Second Treatise of Government. Asserting the right of revolution whenever
government becomes destructive of "certain unalienable rights," the Declaration posits a
natural order in the world whose laws are external to all human will and is coverable
through human reason. Although by the eighteenth century God had withdrawn from
immediate contact with humankind and had been transformed into Final Cause or Prime
Mover of the universe, nature provided an appropriate substitute. Reflecting the decisive
influence of Isaac Newton, all of creation could now be taken as an expression of divine
will. Hence, the only way to know God's will was to discover the law of nature; Locke
and Jefferson had deified nature and denatured God.
31. After the Second World War, the Allies adopted three judicial solutions to the
problem of determining the proper jurisdiction for trying Nazi offenses by the victim
states, solutions additional to the specially constituted Nuremberg Tribunal. The first
solution involved the creation of special courts set up expressly for the purpose at hand.
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nent international criminal court for the prosecution of international
crimes. Yet no such court has been created to date. Contrary to commonly held misconceptions, the International Court of Justice at the
Hague has absolutely no penal or criminal jurisdiction, and therefore is
unsuitable. 2
One obvious jurisdictional solution would be to parallel Nuremberg by
establishing a specially constituted ad hoc tribunal within the defeated
state's territory, perhaps at Baghdad. Another acceptable and more likely
possibility would be to undertake the proceedings within the state that
was Iraq's principal victim, Kuwait. Here, the court could be coalitionwide, as it would be within Iraq, or it could be fully Kuwaiti, depending
upon the desired range of indictments. Legal precedent and justification
for all of these possibilities can be found, among other sources, in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.3 3 Article VI of this Convention provides that trials for its violation

Rumania, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland
adopted this solution. The second solution, adopted in Great Britain, Australia, Canada,
Greece, and Italy, involved the establishment of special military courts. The third solution brought the Nazis and their collaborators before ordinary courts, a solution that
Norway, Denmark, and Yugoslavia accepted. Israel also adopted this solution, although
the State of Israel did not exist at the time of the commission of the crimes in question.
32. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) does have, however, jurisdiction over
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of a number of specialized human
rights conventions. Jurisdiction is accorded by article 9 of the Genocide Convention; article 10 of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; article 9 of the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women; article 8 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; and
article 14 the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In exercising its jurisdiction,
however, the ICJ still must confront significant difficulties in bringing recalcitrant states
into contentious proceedings. No method currently exists to ensure effectively the attendance of defendant states before the ICJ. Although many states have acceded to the Optional Clause of the Statute of the ICJ, article 36, paragraph 2, several have attached
reservations that weaken these accessions.
33. This does not mean, however, that the creation of appropriate tribunals would be
contingent upon Iraqi crimes being authentic instances of genocide as defined at the Convention. Rather, the creation would still be consistent with related genocide-like crimes,
those that may derive from multiple other sources of international law. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (this
Convention should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267); Convention on the
Political Rights of Women, done Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135
(entered into force for the United States, July 7, 1976); Declaration on the Granting of
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be conducted "by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of
which the act was committed,
or by such international penal tribunal as
34
may have jurisdiction.1
C.

The United States Role

From a strictly jurisprudential point of view, crimes of war, crimes
against peace, and crimes against humanity are offenses against humankind over which there is universal jurisdiction 5 and a universal obligaIndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), U.N. GAOR,
15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; American Convention on Human
Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known collectively as the International Bill of Rights, serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of human rights.
34. Genocide Convention, supra note 5, at 8, 78 U.N.T.S. at 281-82. The Genocide
Convention was submitted to the Senate by President Harry Truman in June 1949. On
February 19, 1986, the Senate consented to ratification with the rtervatmn-that-legislation be passed that conforms United-States -law-to-the-precise-terms- of--the-treaty..onz
gress approved this enabling legislation in October 1988,and President Reagan-signedit
on November 4, 1988. This legislation amends the United States CriminalCode to make
genocide a federal offense. It also sets a maximum penalty of life imprisonment- when
death results from a criminal act defined by the law. The Genocide Convention proscribes conduct that is juristically distinct from other-forms-of prohibitedwartime..killing.
For example, the Convention proscribes killing that involves acts constituting crimes. of
war and crimes against humanity. Although crimes against humanity are linked to wartime actions, the crime of genocide can be committed-during-times-of peace-ornwat.A~c
cording to article I of the Genocide Convention:2'The Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Id. at 7, 78 U.N.T.S. at
280.
35. In this connection, Israel's trial of Adolph Eichmann was consistent with the
post-Nuremberg imperatives of international law, and its jurisdiction in the matter
flowed properly from the universal nature of the crime, as well as from the particular
suffering of the Jewish people. The crimes set forth by Israeli law, namely crimes of war
and crimes against humanity, had been established unambiguously as crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunal and the human rights regime derivative from that Tribunal. Therefore, all of the crimes set forth under the Israeli indictment had been recognized by the
universal conscience of mankind and by its institutionalized legal expressions as delicta
juris gentium, or crimes of international law. An international tribunal that might have
judged these crimes did not exist because Nuremberg dealt only with humanity and not
the Jewish People. Israel now has invested properly its legislative and judicial organs of

19911

IRAQI GULF WAR CRIMES

tion to prosecute.3 6 The United States, however, for many complementary reasons, should now take the lead in prosecution of major Iraqi
criminals. These reasons include the special United States role in mili-

tary operations supporting the pertinent Security Council resolutions, the
historic United States role at Nuremberg in 1945, and the long history of
United States acceptance of jurisdictional competence and responsibility
37
on behalf of international law.

state with the power of enforcement. In so doing, it acted upon the well-established practice that each state reserves the right to punish a crime that violates the norms of the law
or nations, regardless of the place in which the offense occurred or the nationality of the
accused or victim. In acting to punish the crime of genocide, Israel acted to safeguard not
only its own interests, but also the interests of the entire community of humankind. By
acting upon the principle of universal jurisdiction, it established beyond any reasonable
doubt that the punishment of genocide is not an internal question for each state, but a
peremptory obligation of humankind.
36. The principle of universal jurisdiction is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between the states in the fight against crime. It is mentioned in the Corpus Juris
Civilis; in Grotius' Dejure belli ac pacis libri tres (Book II, Ch. 20); and in Vattel's Le
droit des gens (Book I, Ch. 19). The case for universal jurisdiction is also in the four
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. These Conventions unambiguously impose
upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain grave breaches of
their rules, regardless of where the infraction occurred or the nationality of the authors
of the crimes. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug.
12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
3418, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 236; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3616, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 386. In further support of universality for certain international crimes,
see 2 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 251-314 (2d ed. 1987). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 402-04 (1987).
37. In addition to the territorial principle, the nationality principle, and the universality principle, two other traditionally recognized bases of jurisdiction exist under international law: the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the offense; and the passive personality principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of the person injured by the offense. The
Genocide Convention, however, does not stipulate universal jurisdiction. A recent example supporting the principle of universal jurisdiction in matters concerning genocide involves an action by the United States. Ruling for the extradition to Israel of accused Nazi
war criminal John Demjanjuk, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in 1985 recognized the applicability of universal jurisdiction for genocide, even though
the crimes charged were committed against persons who were not citizens of Israel and
notwithstanding that the State of Israel did not exist at the time the defendant committed
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In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit noted in 1985, "[t]he law of the United States includes
international law" and "[i]nternational law recognizes a 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses.""5 Article VI of the United States Constitution and a number of court decisions make all international law, conventional and customary, the supreme law of the land. The Nuremberg
Tribunal itself acknowledged that the participating powers "have done
together what any one of them might have done singly.""9
Finally, in exercising its special responsibilities under international
and municipal law concerning prosecution of egregious Iraqi crimes, the
United States already has the competence to prosecute in its own federal
district courts. 40 Pertinent authority can be found in various sections of
the heinous crimes. In the words of the court:
[w]hen proceeding on that jurisdictional premise, neither the nationality of the
accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of the nations or
against humanity and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations.
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d. 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985), cited in 1 M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 286 (1986).
38. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
39. Apart from the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, only two trials under the
Genocide Convention have been held by competent tribunals of the states wherein the
crimes were committed. In Equatorial Guinea, the tyrant Macias was responsible for
widespread massacres, as well as pillaging his country. Ultimately, a revolution overthrew him. Subsequently, he was found guilty of a number of crimes, including genocide,
and was executed. In a report on the trial, however, the legal officer of the International
Commission of Jurists deemed Macia's conviction to the invalid. In Kampuchea, when
the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge, the government brought criminal actions
against the former Prime Minister, Pol Pot, and the deputy prime minister on charges of
genocide. A people's revolutionary tribunal found the accused guilty of the crime in absentia. See LEo KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 16-17 (1985).
40. Since its founding, the United States has reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts. Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States
Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." Pursuant to this
Constitutional prerogative, the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute.
This statute authorized United States federal courts to hear those civil claims by aliens
alleging acts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States," when the alleged wrongdoers are in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
At that time, of course, the particular target of this legislation was piracy on the high
seas.
Over the years, United States federal courts have rarely invoked the law of nations,
and then only for cases in which the acts in question already had been proscribed by
treaties or conventions. In 1979, a case filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York sought damages for foreign acts of torture. In a complaint
filed jointly with his daughter, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a well known Paraguayan physician,
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the United States Code. 4' Therefore, the legal machinery for bringing
Saddam Hussein and his fellow criminals to justice is well established
under international and United States law. The political will to make
this machinery work, however, does not exist currently.4 2 If President
Bush, preferably in concert with other coalition partners, can build upon
the important precedents and expectations of Nuremberg, his efforts
would represent a fitting and distinguished epilogue to the Gulf War.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the Holocaust, Karl Jaspers addressed the question of German guilt. His response to this question articulates one of the
most fertile and important concepts of modern philosophy and law, the
idea of metaphysical guilt. In this connection, Jaspers wrote that "[t]here
exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for
crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do
whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty."' 43 Understood in terms
of the obligation to prosecute Iraqi crimes, Jaspers' doctrine suggests an
urgent need to confront Nuremberg obligations while it would still be
timely.
artist, and opponent of President Alfredo Stroessner's genocidal regime, alleged that
members of that regime's police force had tortured and murdered his son, Joelito. Filartiga v. Penn-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (1980). On June 30, 1980, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that since an international consensus
condemning torture has crystallized, torture violates the law of nations for purposes of
the Alien Tort Statute. Id. at 887-88. Therefore, United States courts have jurisdiction
under the statute to hear civil suits by victims of foreign torture if the alleged international outlaws are found in the United States. Id.
41. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-21 (1988) (forming part of the extraterritorial statutory scheme); 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).
42. Recognizing the perpetrators of Iraqi crimes as common enemies of mankind,
one might even accept that the pertinent legal machinery, in certain residual circumstances, could exclude any sort of tribunal, and that assassination or summary execution
would be appropriate law enforcement. As stated by the earlier views of Vattel:
[W]hile the jurisdiction of each State is in general limited to punishing crimes
committed in its territory, an exception must be made against those criminals who,
by the character and frequency of their crimes, are a menace to public security
everywhere and proclaim themselves enemies of the whole human race. Men who,
by profession, are poisoners, assassins, or incendiaries may be exterminated wherever they are caught; for they direct their disastrous attacks against all Nations by
destroying the foundations of their common safety.
3 VATTEL, supra note 19, at 93.
43. KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 32 (E.B. Ashton trans.,
Caprixorny Books 1961) (1947).

